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INCREASING INVESTOR PROTECTION 
THROUGH IMPROVING HEDGE FUND 
VALUATION 
DEIRDRE FARRELL†
INTRODUCTION 
 
A retired police officer makes ends meet with the pension he 
earned while serving his community for twenty years on the 
force.  A first-generation American becomes the first person in 
her family to attend college with the help of a full scholarship 
from her university.  A charity sends funds for much needed 
medical supplies after a natural disaster strikes in a foreign 
country.  What do all of these scenarios have in common?  The 
funds used to pay for the retired police officer’s pension, the 
student’s university tuition, and the medical supplies all derived 
from investments in hedge funds. 
When most people think of hedge funds, they often think of a 
mysterious, complicated investing entity only accessible to the 
elite and ultra-rich.  However, the industry has evolved from its 
exclusive beginngings.  Institutional investors, such as public 
and private pension funds and educational and charitable 
endowments, now make up a sizable portion of hedge fund 
investors.1
Today, hedge funds manage over $3 trillion dollars in assets 
worldwide.
  While institutional investors may benefit from access 
to more exotic alternative investments such as hedge funds, any 
losses they suffer could profoundly affect the lives of millions of 
everyday Americans. 
2
 
† Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D., 2018, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A. 2011, University of Maryland, College Park. 
  These funds enjoyed little regulation for most of 
1 Cary Martin Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private? Exploring Publicness in 
the Face of Incoherency, 69 SMU L. REV. 405, 408 (2016). 
2 Melissa Karsh, Hedge Fund Assets Pass $3 Trillion in 2016 for First Time: 
Chart, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 23, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/articles/2017-01-23/hedge-fund-assets-pass-3-trillion-in-2016-for-first-time-
chart. 
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their history and the time leading up to the financial crisis of 
2008.3  After the crisis, governments sought to reign in the 
financial services industry and used this opportunity to increase 
regulation of hedge funds.4  In the United States, the Dodd-
Frank Act required hedge fund managers to register with the 
government for the first time.5  While this registration improved 
the transparency of the hedge fund industry in the United 
States,6
Part I gives an overview of hedge funds in general—their 
structure and the major stakeholders involved.  Part II 
summarizes the valuation process and its associated issues.  Part 
III describes recent regulatory changes in the United States 
affecting hedge funds, including the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and 
the JOBS Act of 2012.  Part III also discusses recent changes in 
European regulation of Hedge Funds.  Finally, Part IV proposes 
changes to the existing framework in the United States to 
improve transparency and standardize the valuation process for 
hedge funds.  Part IV also discusses cost concerns of these 
proposals. 
 it did not go far enough to prioritize investor protection.  
A hedge fund’s valuation of the assets it manages is particularly 
important for protecting investors, and the current limited 
oversight of the valuation process leaves room for improvement.  
This Note examines the current hedge fund regulations in the 
United States and in Europe, and proposes ways for regulators to 
improve hedge fund valuation in the United States to increase 
investor protection.  Although valuation issues affect all pooled 
investment vehicles that invest in illiquid, difficult-to-value 
assets, this Note focuses only on the valuation systems of hedge 
funds. 
 
3 Emily Kehoe, Hedge Fund “Regulation” for Systemic Risk: Largely 
Impossible, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 35, 36 (2013). 
4 Id. 
5 Wulf Kaal & Dale Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the 
United States, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law. 
columbia.edu/2016/02/29/the-history-of-hedge-fund-regulation-in-the-united-states/. 
6 Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Hedge Funds – A New Era of 
Transparency and Openness, Speech at Managed Funds Association Outlook 2013 
Conference (Oct. 18, 2013) (transcript available at sec.gov). 
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I. HEDGE FUNDS: A BACKGROUND 
A. Defining a Hedge Fund 
Although hedge funds account for over $3 trillion in assets 
worldwide,7 the definition of what constitutes a “hedge fund” is 
somewhat fluid.8  Generally, hedge funds are characterized as 
pooled alternative investment vehicles, with high minimum 
investment requirements, serving wealthy and sophisticated 
investors.9  For most of their history, hedge funds enjoyed little 
regulation and oversight from regulators across the globe, 
allowing them the freedom to pursue flexible investment 
strategies, such as investing in derivatives and short selling, 
through an unlimited range of investments.10  Unlike more 
traditional pooled investment vehicles, such as mutual funds, 
hedge funds use high amounts of leverage.  This practice allows 
hedge funds to invest with borrowed money, thereby amplifying 
potential returns or losses.11
Hedge funds have increased in popularity over the past 
several decades.
 
12  At the turn of the millennium, the hedge fund 
industry managed approximately $500 billion in assets.13  That 
amount has steadily increased, breaking the three trillion dollar 
mark in 2015.14
 
7 Karsh, supra note 2. 
  During the global financial crisis of 2008, 
investors flocked to hedge funds because of their ability to 
8 TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT 
FINAL REPORT 4 (2009) (“[T]here is no consistent or agreed-upon definition of the 
term hedge fund . . . [A]n approach for identifying these types of entities is to look at 
the kinds of characteristics of and strategies employed by institutions that would 
consider themselves to be hedge funds.”); STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS viii (2003) (“[A]n entity 
that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets that does not register its 
securities offerrings under the Securities Act and which is not registered as an 
investment company under the Investment Company Act.”). 
9 Harry McVea, Hedge Fund Asset Valuations and the Work of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 57 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 1, 4 (2008). 
10 Id. at 5. 
11 Id. 
12 Mary Childs & Miles Johnson, SEC’s Pursuit of Leon Cooperman Rattles 
Hedge Fund Industry, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016, 7:38 PM), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/d10eadba-80db-11e6-bc52-0c7211ef3198. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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diversify risk and beat market returns in a downturn.15  
Although hedge funds have failed to beat market returns for the 
past several years,16 they remain popular among investors and 
continue to see an inflow of new investment.17
B. Hedge Fund Structure 
 
Hedge funds consist of three major players: the fund itself, 
the hedge fund manager or management company, and the 
investors.18  Most hedge funds in the United States operate as 
limited partnerships,19 with the hedge fund manager serving as 
general partner.20  As general partner, the hedge fund manager 
executes the investment strategy and manages the fund’s 
operational practices.21  Hedge fund managers usually hire “c-
suite” officers, such as a chief executive officer, a chief financial 
officer, and a chief compliance officer, to manage the operations 
of the business.  Hedge fund managers also typically form 
committees to oversee the risk and valuation functions of the 
hedge fund.22
In exchange for managing the investment portfolio and the 
operational aspects of a fund, hedge fund managers typically 
charge a “two and twenty” fee whereby managers receive annual 
compensation of two percent of total assets under management 
(“AUM”) and twenty percent of profits from those assets, earned 
above a predetermined benchmark.
 
23
 
15 See Shelby, supra note 1, at 430; Lawrence Delevingne & Svea Herbst-
Bayliss, Public Pensions Stick with Hedge Funds Despite Frustrations, REUTERS, 
May 10, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-hedgefunds-pensionfunds-idUS 
KCN0Y12I0. 
  Additionally, most hedge 
funds’ governing partnership agreements require the 
16 Childs & Johnson, supra note 12 (Hedge funds as a whole failed to beat the 
S&P 500 from 2012-2016). Several large U.S. pension funds, including plans for 
California’s, New Jersey’s, and Philadelphia’s employees, have scaled back 
investments in hedge funds. Id. 
17 Shelby, supra note 1, at 430; Delevingne & Herbst-Bayliss, supra note 15. 
18 Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Fund Governance, 19 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 
141, 150 (2013). 
19 Id.; Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge 
Fund Managers’ Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251, 3261 (2009). 
20 Shadab, supra note 18. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 151. 
23 See Lindsay Fortado, Hedge Fund Investors Question ‘2 and 20’ Fees, FIN. 
TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/291081ba-49df-11e7-a3f4-c742b97 
91d43. 
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management company to invest some of its own money into the 
fund.24  Both of these provisions, the “two and twenty” fee and 
the requirement that management be personally invested in the 
fund, seek to align the manager’s incentives with the investors’ 
incentives—to maximize returns.25  The vast majority of hedge 
funds do not have a board of directors to act as a watchdog over 
the fund managers, as they would in a typical corporation or in 
many limited liability corporations.26  Nevertheless, fund 
managers still owe fiduciary duties to the fund itself.27
Investors, on the other hand, serve as limited partners in a 
hedge fund limited partnership, providing capital to the fund but 
relinquishing nearly all managerial control to the fund 
managers.
 
28  Investors’ only true decision-making power lies in 
their wallets—in the amount of capital they choose to invest with 
a particular fund, and in their decision whether or not to 
withdraw that money over time.29  Unlike mutual funds and 
other pooled investment vehicles, hedge fund operating 
agreements generally require investors to lock-in their capital for 
a period of time, with typical lock-in periods ranging from less 
than a quarter to a full year.30  Hedge fund operating agreements 
also generally only permit investors to withdraw funds on a 
periodic basis, such as quarterly or semi-annually.31  
Additionally, managers often maintain discretionary power to 
bar withdrawals for a period of time.32
 
24 Most hedge funds require the managers to invest their own funds as a way 
to offset the additional risk investors take on. Sklar, supra note 19, at 3266. Under 
the “two and twenty” management fee arrangement, hedge fund managers share in 
a funds’ profits, but not in its losses. Shadab, supra note 18, at 166. 
  Hedge fund managers’ 
ability to lock-in investors’ capital for at least a short period of 
25 Sklar, supra note 19, at 3266. 
26 Kehoe, supra note 3, at 45. 
27 Shadab, supra note 18, at 151. 
28 Although limited partnerships have the ability to give voting rights to 
limited partners, hedge fund partnership agreements usually do not give investors 
this power. Id. at 153. Therefore, investors do not have the ability to vote for or 
remove management, as is often the case with other forms of investment funds. Id. 
29 Id. at 153–54. 
30 Publically registered mutual funds are required to redeem shares to 
investors within seven calendar days. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012). 
31 Shadab, supra note 18, at 154. 
32 Id. Hedge fund agreements usually require investors to “give thirty to ninety 
days’ notice before withdrawing” funds. Id. Funds may also limit the amount of 
capital an investor may withdraw at any one time, usually stipulated as a 
percentage of the value of the fund, and/or “limit redemptions to a portion of the 
investor’s own capital.” Id. 
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time provides management with some flexibility in pursuing its 
investment strategy by preventing destabilizing liquidity 
problems.33
C. Accredited Investors 
 
Another defining feature of hedge funds is that, as private 
funds, they are restricted to investments from “accredited 
investors.”34  In Regulation D Rule 501 of the Securities Act of 
1933, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) defines 
an accredited investor, in the context of a natural person, as 
someone who has (1) income that exceeded $200,000, or $300,000 
together with a spouse, in each of the prior two years, or (2) a net 
worth exceeding $1,000,000, either alone or together with a 
spouse.35  The SEC’s definition of an accredited investor also 
encompasses institutional investors.  This category includes 
banks, insurance companies, and employee benefit plans, as well 
as charitable organizations, corporations, partnerships, and 
trusts with assets in excess of five million dollars.36
Congress limits hedge funds to accredited investors under 
the theory that persons or entities who meet these criteria can 
bear the economic risk associated with investing in these 
alternative investment vehicles.
 
37
 
33 Id. at 155. 
  Further, since only accredited 
investors can invest in hedge funds, many policymakers argue 
against expending precious government resources to regulate or 
monitor hedge funds in the name of investor protection.  
However, these policymakers fail to recognize that average 
Americans provide a significant amount of the investment capital 
for many of these accredited institutional investors.  As a result, 
hedge funds’ investment decisions profoundly impact the lives of 
countless Americans. 
34 As private funds, hedge funds are excluded from the definition of an 
“investment company.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2012). Private funds may not make a 
public offering of their shares and, as a result, are limited to “accredited investors” 
in order to allow for a private offering complying with Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. § 
230.506 (2017). 
35 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2017). 
36 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1) (2017). 
37 OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR 
BULLETIN: ACCREDITED INVESTORS 1 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_ 
accreditedinvestors.pdf. 
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For instance, millions of Americans rely on hedge fund 
investments to fund their pensions: forty-two percent of the 242 
institutional investors that made up the “$1 billion club,” defined 
as institutions that had at least $1 billion of capital invested in 
hedge funds in 2016,38 were either public or private pension 
funds.39  The Public School & Education Employee Retirement 
Systems of Missouri invested twelve percent of its $38 billion in 
hedge funds.40  Similarly, the San Francisco City & County 
Employee’s Retirement System voted to increase its investment 
in hedge funds from five percent to fifteen percent in September 
2017 and expects to have $3.15 billion invested in hedge funds by 
the end of 2018.41
Additionally, endowments and foundations made up another 
significant portion of the “$1 billion club,” accounting for fifteen 
percent of these heavy-hitter institutional investors.
  Essentially, the dedicated teachers of Missouri 
and civil servants of San Francisco, among millions of others, are 
relying on hedge fund investments to ensure their financial 
security in retirement. 
42  These 
same endowments and foundations fund charities and 
educational institutions in the U.S. and around the world.  
Combined, public and private pension funds, foundations, and 
endowments, account for over fifty percent of hedge funds’ largest 
institutional investors. In other words, how hedge funds invest 
these organizations’ capital significantly affects millions of 
Americans from all socioeconomic statuses.43
These institutional investors are fueling much of the growth 
the hedge fund industry is experiencing.  The number of public 
pensions that invest in hedge funds grew from 234 in 2010 to 282 
in 2016, and “[t]he average percentage of pension portfolios in 
 
 
38 Preqin, The $1Bn Club: Largest Investors in Hedge Funds, 9 HEDGE FUND 
SPOTLIGHT, no. 1, 2017, at 1, 5, http://docs.preqin.com/newsletters/hf/Preqin-Hedge-
Fund-Spotlight-May-2017.pdf. “The $1Bn Club” institutional investors account for 
$805 billion dollars invested in hedge funds. Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Delevingne & Herbst-Bayliss, supra note 15. 
41 Randy Diamond, San Francisco Allocates $250 Million to 3 Managers, 
Proposes Hedge Fund Ramp Up, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Oct. 10, 2017), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20171010/ONLINE/171019982/san-francisco-
allocates-250-million-to-3-managers-proposes-hedge-fund-ramp-up-searches-and-
hires?template=print. 
42 Preqin, supra note 38, at 6. 
43 Id. 
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hedge funds has also r[isen] to nearly ten percent.”44  While it is 
true that institutional investors generally enjoy a higher level of 
sophistication than a typical individual investor, the level of 
sophistication across institutional investors varies,45 and even 
the most sophisticated institutional investor cannot overcome 
incomplete or bad data, both of which can arise from a lack of 
regulation or oversight.46
II. INVESTOR PROTECTION: VALUATION OVERVIEW 
 
With this structure in mind, there are several areas of 
concern regarding investor protection under the current hedge 
fund governance and regulatory model.  Chief among these 
concerns are how hedge fund managers value a fund’s 
investments and the potential conflicts of interest that exist in 
this process. 
A. Fair Value Accounting and Valuation 
After the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), which is responsible for 
developing the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(“GAAP”) in the United States, clarified existing rules for 
 
44 Delevingne & Herbst-Bayliss, supra note 15. 
45 See Jongho Kim, Can Risks Be Reduced in the Derivatives Market? Lessons 
from the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial Engineering Debacles, 6 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 29, 45–48 (2007) (describing the bankruptcy of Orange 
County, CA caused by the municipality’s investments in risky derivatives, and 
explaining that “the main cause of Orange Country's failure in the use of derivatives 
lay . . . in the people who acted without knowledge of them”); Saul Hansell, Bankers 
Trust Settles Suit with P.&G., N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1996/05/10/business/bankers-trust-settles-suit-with-p-g.html (“Procter & Gamble 
was perhaps the most prominent corporation to contend that it did not understand 
the risk of derivatives after its two deals with Bankers Trust lost value very rapidly 
in 1994.”). 
46 See Tom Loftus, Lawsuit: Retirement Systems Gambled on Hedge Funds, 
Concealed Its Financial Mess, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Dec. 27, 2017, 2:25 PM), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/27/lawsuit-kentucky-
retirement-systems-gambled-hedge-funds/982740001/. In December 2017, Kentucky 
state employees sued retirement system officials and three hedge fund managers, 
alleging breach of fiduciary duties when the managers “lur[ed]” the retirement 
system into making investments in the funds “without fully disclosing the high 
risks, massive fees and lack of transparency.” Id. These investments failed to pay off, 
leaving the retirement system that services 360,000 state employees with a deficit of 
billions. Id. 
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measuring and accounting for an asset’s fair value.47  Fair value 
is defined as the price that would be received to sell an asset 
between market participants at the measurement date.48  Under 
the new rules, assets are classified into three levels based on 
their liquidity,49 or the relative ease with which the asset can be 
converted into cash.50  On one end of the spectrum, level one 
assets, such as stocks and bonds, have observable quoted prices 
for identical assets in active markets.51  On the other end, level 
three assets, such as derivatives and distressed debt, are 
generally highly illiquid assets for which there is no observable 
market pricing.52  Level two assets lie somewhere in the middle.53
In an ideal valuation scenario, an asset is freely traded in a 
deep, liquid market (level one) and, therefore, the asset’s fair 
value is easily identified on any given day as its current 
exchange-traded price.
 
54  However, for more illiquid assets (levels 
two and three), accurately valuing the asset is far less 
straightforward.  A number of variables must be considered, 
including the “[v]alue of similar financial instruments,” the 
“[r]eliability of estimates,” the reliability of financial modeling 
used, and the “[r]easonableness of assumptions,” among others.55  
As a result, “[d]etermining [f]air [v]alue where no exchange-
traded price exists is more of an art than a science, as a number 
of assumptions and estimates must be made.”56
 
47 Daisy Maxey, If a Security Isn’t Trading, What Is It Really Worth?, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 4, 2014, 1:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-looking-at-how-altern 
ative-funds-value-investments-1391096281?tesla=y. 
  As alternative 
investment vehicles, almost half of a hedge fund’s assets typically 
fall within the difficult-to-value asset categories, levels two and 
48 FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT, Accounting Standards Codification No. 820, 
§ 10-20 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2015). 
49 Id. § 10-50-2. 
50 Accounting Liquidity, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/ 
a/accounting-liquidity (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
51  FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT, Accounting Standards Codification No. 820, 
§ 10-20 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2015). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. § 10-35-48. Level 2 assets include assets with (1) “quoted [market] prices 
for similar assets or liabilities in active markets”; (2) quoted prices for identical or 
similar assets in inactive markets; or (3) “inputs other than quoted prices that are 
observable for the asset.” Id. 
54 ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N (AIMA), AIMA’S GUIDE TO SOUND PRACTICES FOR 
HEDGE FUND VALUATION 45 (2013). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
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three.57  Therefore, a significant portion of most hedge funds’ 
valuations of their  
assets depends on judgment calls about how to accurately and 
consistently account for these variables. Such judgment calls are 
“susceptible to abuse.”58
B. Valuation Concerns 
 
An accurate valuation of a hedge fund’s assets is critical for 
several reasons.  First, funds measure and report their 
performance to investors based on how the fair value of their 
portfolio assets change over time.59  Current investors look to a 
fund’s performance when deciding whether to keep their capital 
with the fund, and potential new investors consider a fund’s past 
performance60 when deciding whether or not to invest with the 
fund.61  Within the past several years, regulators at the SEC 
have expressed concern that some managers might be 
exaggerating the performance of holdings to entice new 
investors.62
Second, hedge fund managers are compensated based on the 
net asset valuation and the performance of the fund.
 
63  While this 
form of compensation is intended to align the hedge fund 
managers’ interests with the investors’ interests, it also creates a 
conflict of interest by possibly incentivizing managers to mark up 
the fund’s valuation to increase their compensation.64
 
57 Id. at 8 (reporting that a representative sample of AIMA’s hedge fund 
members had thirty percent level two investments and thirteen percent level three 
investments). 
  Since 
many of a hedge fund’s assets are categorized as level two and 
58 Maxey, supra note 47. 
59 See supra Part II.B. 
60 Although past performance of a fund is not an accurate indicator of future 
outcomes, investors continue to weigh heavily a fund’s past performance when 
choosing where to invest their capital. McGraw Hill Fin., Does Past Performance 
Matter? The Persistence Scorecard, S&P DOW JONES INDICES 1, 2 (2015), 
https://us.spindices.com/documents/spiva/persistence-scorecard-june-2015.pdf. 
61 ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N (AIMA), supra note 54, at 17. “From the [i]nvestor’s 
perspective, fair valuation is the foundation on which analysis of the portfolio’s 
performance and volatility of returns is based . . . . [A]n [i]nvestor would normally 
expect that the amount of cash paid to take an equity interest in the portfolio and 
the amount of cash received on withdrawal of an equity interest is based on a formal 
and fair valuation of the portfolio’s assets and liabilities.” Id. 
62 Maxey, supra note 47. 
63 Sklar, supra note 19, at 3265. 
64 Id. at 3269. 
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three assets, their valuation is dependent on a number of 
variables and judgment calls, making them more vulnerable to 
manipulation by a fund’s management.65
Finally, under the current U.S. hedge fund regulatory 
scheme, no single organization has the authority to develop and 
enforce mandatory valuation standards.
 
66  Although various 
organizations have produced valuation guidelines, none carry the 
force of law in the United States.67  Therefore, there is little 
standardization and oversight of the valuation process even 
though valuation plays a key role in the hedge fund business, 
making it difficult for investors to comprehend and compare fund 
valuations.68
III. RECENT CHANGES IN HEDGE FUND REGULATION AND 
CURRENT INDUSTRY VALUATION PRACTICES 
 
A. United States Hedge Fund Regulation – Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 was the single most sweeping piece of 
legislation affecting hedge funds in the United States in the past 
several decades.69
 
65 See supra Part III.A. 
  Passed in the wake of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act sought to improve all aspects 
of the financial services industry by preventing fraud, increasing 
66 See generally Hossein Nabilou & Alessio M. Pacces, The Hedge Fund 
Regulation Dilemma: Direct vs. Indirect Regulation, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 183 
(2015). 
67 Competing authorities include the Alternative Investment Management 
Association, which published its Guide to Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Valuation 
(ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N (AIMA), supra note 54); the Hedge Fund Standards Board, 
which issued principles in 2015 (THE HEDGE FUND STANDARDS (HEDGE FUND 
STANDARDS BD. 2015)); the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute’s Global 
Performance Investment Standards (GLOBAL PERFORMANCE INVESTMENT STANDARDS 
(CFA INST. 2010)); and the International Organization of Securities Commission’s 
(“IOSCO”) Hedge Fund Principles (TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. 
COMM’NS, supra note 8). 
68 See generally Joshua Rogers, All Hedge Funds May Not Be Bad – Here’s How 
to Suss Yours Out, FORBES (Apr. 1, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuarogers/ 
2013/04/01/all-hedge-funds-may-be-bad-heres-how-to-suss-yours-out/#72c5e9a65a89. 
69 Cecilia C. Lee, Reframing Complexity: Hedge Fund Policy Paradigm for the 
Way Forward, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 478, 480 (2015). 
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investor protection, and limiting systemic risk.70  Although 
experts disagree as to the level of involvement hedge funds had 
in the global financial crisis,71 legislators viewed the Dodd-Frank 
financial services reform bill as an opportunity to close 
regulatory loopholes that persisted after previous failed attempts 
to register hedge funds with the federal government.72
Prior to Dodd-Frank, many hedge fund managers escaped 
registration through a series of exemptions included in the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
 
73  However, Title IV of Dodd-
Frank, entitled the Private Fund Investment Advisers 
Registration Act of 2010 (“PFIARA”), removed most of these 
exemptions, forcing hedge fund managers to register with the 
government.74  Under the provisions in PFIARA and rules issued 
by the SEC in 2011, hedge fund managers with more than $150 
million in assets under management are required to register as 
investment advisers with the SEC.75  Dodd-Frank also 
authorized the SEC to promulgate rules requiring enhanced 
disclosure for hedge fund managers.76
Under the new Dodd-Frank registration rules, hedge fund 
managers, as investment advisers, are required to maintain and 
 
 
70 Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243, 262 (2013). 
71 See Reint Gropp, How Important Are Hedge Funds in a Crisis?, FED. RES. 
BANK OF S.F. ECON. LETTER (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/files/el2014-11.pdf (arguing that hedge funds play a prominent role in 
transmitting shocks to the rest of the financial market and, thus, may amplify 
systemic risk more than previously thought). But see Kaal, supra note 70, at 248 
(“[H]edge funds were not identifiable as the culprits for the financial crisis.”). 
72 In 2004, “the SEC, using its rulemaking authority under the Investment 
Advisers Act, issued a [formal] rule requiring hedge fund [managers] to register 
under that [A]ct.” Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 5. The rule spurred significant 
resistance from the hedge fund industry. Id. In July 2006, the D.C. Circuit vacated 
the hedge fund rule in Goldstein v. SEC, calling the rule arbitrary rulemaking. Id. 
Most hedge fund advisers who had registered under the 2004 registration rule 
promptly deregistered. Id. 
73 Most relied on the “small firm” exception. Id. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a–3(c)(1) 
(2010). 
74 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 403 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006)) 
(striking the private adviser exemption under section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, 
thereby precluding many private fund advisers from avoiding registration). 
75 Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers 
With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private 
Advisers, 76 Fed. Reg. 39646-01, 39666–67 (July 6, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.203(m)-1). 
76 Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 5. 
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file records and reports with the SEC containing information 
such as the hedge fund’s total assets under management, its use 
of leverage, valuation methodologies, types of assets held, and 
other information deemed “necessary . . . for the protection of 
investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.”77  Additionally, 
as part of registration, hedge fund managers must make such 
records available for periodic inspections by the SEC.78
The Dodd-Frank Act also created the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (“FSOC”) to monitor systemic risk to the U.S. 
financial system.
 
79  The SEC and Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”) together created the Form PF to collect the 
information proscribed in Title IV of Dodd-Frank and to assist 
the FSOC “in monitoring [hedge funds’] risk to the U.S. financial 
system.”80  Information reported on the Form PF is kept 
confidential once filed with the government; however, the 
government may use information reported in its examinations 
and enforcement actions.81  Funds with assets under 
management exceeding $150 million, but less than $1.5 billion, 
are required to file the Form PF annually, and funds with assets 
exceeding $1.5 billion are required to file quarterly.82
Under post-Dodd-Frank regulations, many hedge fund 
managers now must also complete the Form ADV.
 
83  Part One of 
Form ADV requires funds to disclose general information about 
the investment adviser, including information about its 
employees, clients, compensation, the value of assets under 
management, custodians, and ownership and control.84  Reponses 
to Part One are publicly available.85
 
77 15 U.S.C § 80b-4(2), (3)(H) (2012). 
  Part Two of Form ADV is 
only distributed to the government and investors and contains 
78 Id. § 404(b)(6). 
79 Id. § 111. 
80 SEC. & FUND SERV. PRIME FIN., Form PF The Impact on Private Advisers, 
CITIBANK 1, 1 (2012), https://www.citibank.com/mss/docs/Impact_on_Private_ 
Fund.pdf. 
81 BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, GUIDE TO SEC INVESTMENT ADVISER 
REGISTRATION FOR HEDGE FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUND MANAGERS 18–19 
(2012), https://www.morganlewis.com/alerts/2011/02/~/media/e87b98c6bc794d3fb2e1 
dd629dc5de11.ashx. 
82 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF 1–2, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ 
2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf [hereinafter FORM PF]. 
83 Kehoe, supra note 3, at 46; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV, 
https://www.sec.gov/files/formadv.pdf. 
84 BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, supra note 81, at 9; Kehoe, supra note 3, at 45. 
85 BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, supra note 81, at 9. 
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information regarding an investment advisers’ business and 
funds managed, conflicts of interest, and advisory personnel.86
B. United States  Hedge Fund Regulation - JOBS Act of 2012 
 
In addition to Dodd-Frank, the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups (“JOBS”) Act of 2012 shaped the hedge fund regulatory 
landscape by ending the solicitation ban for private companies 
relying on Rule 506 of Regulation D.87  Before the JOBS Act, 
hedge funds and other private issuers were largely prohibited 
from engaging in any form of advertising for their investments.88  
However, hedge funds can now market themselves to a broader 
audience.89  While many view the removal of the solicitation ban 
under the JOBS Act as a positive step towards transparency, 
critics see it as an opportunity to “lure unsophisticated 
investors,” including less sophisticated institutional investors,90 
into a world of complicated investments “they do not fully 
understand and cannot easily leave.”91
C. Changes in Regulation Outside of the United States – AIFMD 
European Approach 
 
The United States was not the only country propelled by the 
global financial crisis to reexamine regulation and oversight of 
the hedge fund industry.  The European Union responded by 
creating the Alternative Investment Fund Managers’ Directive 
(“AIFMD”) in 2011.92
 
86 Id. 
  The AIFMD is a regulatory framework 
requiring registration and enhanced reporting for alternative 
87 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a), 126 
Stat. 306, 313–314 (2012). 
88 Cary Martin, One Step Forward for Hedge Fund Investors: The Removal of 
the Solicitation Ban and the Challenges that Lie Ahead, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1143, 
1145 (2014). Prior to the JOBS Act, private issuers, including hedge funds, were 
allowed to raise unlimited capital but only from accredited investors, and, in doing 
so, were largely restricted from advertising to the general public as to preserve the 
private nature of the investments. Id. 
89 Alexandra Stevenson, With Ban on Ads Removed, Hedge Funds Test Waters, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/with-ban-on-ads-
lifted-hedge-funds-test-waters/?_r=1. 
90 See supra Part II.C and notes 45–46. 
91 Stevenson, supra note 89. 
92 Kehoe, supra note 3, at 36; Directive 2011/61, of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and 
Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 
1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1. 
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investment fund managers (“AIFMs”), including managers of 
hedge funds and private equity firms.93  The aims of the AIFMD 
include (1) preventing market instability and the buildup of 
systemic risk in the Eurpean financial market; (2) improving 
investor protection through increased investor disclosure and 
mandatory reporting; and (3) harmonizing rules across member 
states to improve efficiency and level playing fields.94  Entities 
affected by the directive were given until July 22, 2014 to comply 
with the directive’s mandates.95  The directive applies  
generally to AIFMs who are based in the European Union, to 
AIFMs who manage alternative investment funds (“AIFs”) based 
in the European Union, and to AIFMs who market AIFs within 
the European Union.96
Similar to the Form PF, the AIFMD grants exceptions to 
registration for AIFMs with assets below a certain threshold.
 
97  If 
the fund is leveraged and has less than €100 million in assets 
under management, or unleveraged and less than €500 million in 
assets, the fund’s advisors are exempt from registration 
altogether.98
In terms of valuation, the AIFMD regulates the processes 
and procedures that AIFMs must follow, rather than prescribing 
substantive rules.  AIFMs must either hire an external valuation 
expert to value its portfolio performance and assets under 
management, or they must create an in-house valuation team 
that is functionally independent from the portfolio managers.
 
99
 
93 AIFMD, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/aifmd. 
  
Under the directive, if a fund chooses to use in-house valuation 
staff, the AIFM must ensure that it takes proper measures to 
mitigate any potential conflicts of interest and disclose them 
94 Id. 
95 DUFF & PHELPS, Enhancing Independence: How Can Fund Managers 
Comply with AIFMD Valuation Requirements, VALUATION INSIGHTS, 1, 4 (2015), 
https://www.duffandphelps.com/-/media/assets/pdfs/publications/valuation/valuation-
insights/q2-2015-valuation-insights.ashx. 
96 The directive applies to (1) “EU[-based] AIFMs which manage one or more 
AIFs” (whether EU or non-EU AIFs); (2) “non-EU AIFMs, which manage one or 
more EU AIFs;” and (3) “non-EU AIFMs which market one or more AIFs in the 
[European] Union” (whether EU or non-EU AIFs). Council Directive 2011/61, art. 
2(1), 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1. 
97 Id. at art. 3(2). 
98 Id. 
99 AIFMD Factsheet: Valuation, MATHESON 1 (2016), http://www.matheson. 
com/images/uploads/publications/AIFMD_Factsheet_Valuation.pdf. 
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where they exist.100  In instances where the AIFM elects to use 
in-house valuation staff, regulators retain the power to require 
the AIFM to undergo verification of valuation by an external 
valuation expert or auditor.101  If an AIFM chooses to appoint an 
external valuation expert, the AIFM must demonstrate that the 
external party is professionally recognized and can furnish 
professional guarantees.102  Regardless of whether the AIFM 
appoints an external valuation expert or utilizes in-house 
valuation staff, the AIFM retains ultimate responsibility and 
liability for the calculation of the fund’s net asset value and the 
proper valuation of the fund’s assets.103
The directive prescribes that an AIFM determine the 
valuation methodologies that will be used for each type of asset 
in which the AIFM will invest.
 
104  These methodologies must be 
applied consistently, and the policies and procedures for 
valuation must be reviewed at least annually.105  Additionally, 
the directive requires AIFMs to provide investors with a 
description of these valuation methodologies, including “the 
methods used in valuing hard-to-value assets.”106
The directive further requires the AIFM to file an annual 
report with their home state regulators and to distribute the 
report to investors upon request.
 
107  Unlike the Form PF, 
information contained in the AIFM annual report includes the 
fund’s investment strategies, trading techniques, leverage 
sources, and kinds of assets held.108
D. Current Valuation Practices in the United States 
 
Although Europe’s regulations provide substantial detail for 
the process of hedge fund valuation, regulations in the United 
States have left this area untouched.109
 
100 Id. 
  As a result, hedge fund 
101 Id. 
102 “[W]hat constitutes as ‘professional guarantee’ is not defined under the 
AIFMD.” Id. 
103 Id. at 2. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Directive 2011/61, art. 23(1)(g), 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1. 
107 Kehoe, supra note 3, at 53. 
108 Id. 
109 See generally Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 66. 
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managers are self-policing when it comes to the valuation of a 
fund’s assets.110
In the field of public accounting in the U.S., the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) produces the Generally 
Accepted Accounting principles (“GAAP”), which all public 
companies must adhere to in their accounting methods and 
preparation of financial statements.
 
111  However, no analogous 
authoritative body exists in the U.S. for alternative investment 
valuation.112  Instead, in hedge fund valuation, competing 
authorities issue guidance and principles, none of which carry 
the force of law in the United States.113  Therefore, even the most 
sophisticated investors find themselves at a disadvantage when 
performing due diligence on prospective hedge fund investments 
because they have no guarantee that the information they are 
comparing is actually comparable.  As discussed previously in 
this Note, the SEC officially has the authority to demand 
inspection of any registered hedge fund’s records at any time.114  
However,in reality, the SEC lacks the person-power to use this as 
a meaningful enforcement mechanism for valuation.115
E. Recent Hedge Fund Valuation Cases and Enforcement 
Actions 
  
Practically speaking, this leaves a large gap in investor 
protection. 
Recent cases brought by the SEC and DOJ against hedge 
fund managers highlight weaknesses in the current valuation 
process that are most ripe for improvement through regulation.  
The first weakness is the possibility of direct manipulation of a 
funds’ assets by the hedge fund managers.  In December 2016, 
the SEC charged the founder and managers of Platinum 
Partners, a one billion dollar hedge fund, with “conducting a 
 
110 Hedge funds are still subject to general prohibitions against fraud and 
managers owe a fiduciary duty to the funds they manage. OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & 
ADVOCACY, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR BULLETIN: HEDGE FUNDS 1 (2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_hedgefunds.pdf. 
111 About the FASB, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., http://www.fasb.org/ 
facts/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
112 See supra Part III.B and note 67. 
113 See supra Part III.B and note 67. 
114 See supra Part IV.A. 
115 Francis J. Facciolo, Do I Have a Bridge for You: Fiduciary Duties and 
Investment Advice, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 101, 149 (2014). 
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fraudulent scheme to inflate asset values and illicitly move 
investor money to cover...liquidity problems.”116
By the end of 2014, eighty percent of Platinum’s assets were 
illiquid “level three” assets.
 
117  Management touted its use of an 
independent valuation agent to investors.118 In reality, the fund’s 
founder and Chief Investment Officer, Mark Nordlicht, often 
instructed his staff to adjust the values of various positions up or 
down, leaving the staff to flesh out the rationales for the 
adjustments.119  Although the fund’s auditor in 2015 reported 
that a “material weakness” existed in the fund’s valuation 
process of level three assets, management never disclosed these 
findings to investors, and subsequently terminated the auditor.120  
Platinum’s control over valuations allowed the managers to 
substantially overstate the value of the fund’s largest assets.121  
Platinum’s managers began operating the fund like a Ponzi 
scheme by misrepresenting the fund’s performance to lure in new 
investors, and then using the new investors’ capital to pay out 
redemptions to old investors.122
The second observable weakness from recent cases is the 
possibility of a lack of independence of third parties offering 
comparable price inputs.  In November 2015, former portfolio 
manager Michael Balboa was convicted and sentenced to four 
years in prison for manipulating the valuation of Nigerian debt 
held by his fund, Millennium Global Investments 
(“Millennium”).
 
123
 
116 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Platinum Funds and 
Founder with Defrauding Investors (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
pressrelease/2016-267.html#. 
  The fund held positions in thinly traded, 
117 Complaint at 16, SEC v. Platinum Management (NY) LLC, 2017 WL 
5634983 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016) (No. 16-CV-06848). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 In one instance, Platinum’s overstatement of an oil company, Golden Gate 
LLC, resulted in an overstatement of thirteen percent of the fund’s total assets 
under management in 2014. Id. at 3. 
122 Alexandra Stevenson, Platinum Hedge Fund Executives Charged with $1 
Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/ 
business/dealbook/platinum-partners-hedge-fund-founder-and-6-others-charged-
with-fraud.html. 
123 United States v. Balboa, 622 F. App’x 31, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2015); Nate 
Raymond, Ex-Millennium Global Fund Manager Loses U.S. Fraud Appeal, 
REUTERS, Nov. 18, 2015, 11:40 AM, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-
balboa-idUSKCN0T72ES20151118. 
FINAL_FARRELL 9/10/2018  1:54 PM 
2018] INCREASING INVESTOR PROTECTION 167 
illiquid Nigerian debt.124  Pursuant to Millennium’s Valuation 
Service Agreement, Millennium engaged GlobeOp Financial 
Services (“GlobeOp”), an independent valuation services firm, to 
act as the firm’s valuation agent and calculate the Fund’s net 
asset value each month.125  For illiquid assets with no observable 
trading market to compare prices, GlobeOp solicited opinions of 
brokers or counterparties trading similar securities to determine 
the most accurate valuation.126  Balboa suggested GlobeOp 
consult Gilles De Charsonville, a counterparty working in 
emerging market debt at a broker-dealer, to provide valuations 
on fifteen to twenty of Millenniums’ difficult-to-value 
securities.127  GlobeOp used De Charsonville because Balboa and 
De Charsonville held De Charsonville out as an independent 
source.128  However, unknown to GlobeOp, De Charsonville 
agreed to provide GlobeOp with prices supplied by Balboa and 
present them as his own findings.129  The scheme lasted for over 
a year and caused the fund’s value to be overstated by eighty 
million dollars in August 2008.130
In addition to these cases, in the past several years, the SEC 
has launched a series of investigations into other hedge funds 
related to their valuation process.
 
131  According to SEC 
Enforcement Director Andrew Ceresney, the SEC considers 
valuation a “core issue[]” when looking for hedge fund manager 
misconduct.132
 
124 Raymond, supra note 123. 
 
125 SEC v. Balboa, No. 11 Civ. 8731 PAC, 2015 WL 4092328, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 6, 2015). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 2. 
128 Id. at 1. 
129 Id. at 2. 
130 Raymond, supra note 123. In a similar case, the SEC fined Alphabridge 
Capital Management and its owners five million dollars for inflating the value of its 
holdings of mortgage-backed securities by colluding with broker-dealers to supply 
favorable price quotes to the fund’s auditors. Carmin Germaine, SEC Fines 
Alphabridge Capital $5M Over Inflated MBS Prices, LAW360, (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/674630/sec-fines-alphabridge-capital-5m-over-
inflated-mbs-prices. 
131 In May 2016, the SEC was investigating RD Legal Capital LLC, Platinum 
Partners LP, and Visium Asset Management, LP. Rob Copeland and Aruna 
Viswanatha, Wall Street Cops to Hedge Funds: Treat Investors Better; Regulators 
Ramp Up Scrutiny, with Investigations Focusing on How Thinly Traded Investments 
Are Valued, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-funds-
treatment-of-investors-gets-new-scrutiny-1462808155. 
132 Id. 
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO IMPROVE UNITED STATES 
REGULATIONS FOR HEDGE FUNDS 
Registration of hedge funds under the Dodd-Frank Act was a 
step in the right direction, helping to shed light on this 
mysterious, shadowy industry.  The increased reporting has 
provided the government with a clearer picture of the industry133 
and allowed regulators to better analyze the systemic risk 
associated with the industry.134
First, the SEC should follow the lead of the AIFMD and 
promulgate rules that would require hedge funds to establish 
transparent independent valuation functions.  Similar to under 
the AIFMD, funds could achieve this independent valuation 
function through two methods: either by (1) outsourcing all of 
valuation calculations to a qualified external valuation expert, or 
(2) creating an internal valuation function that is functionally 
independent of the portfolio managers.
  However, the registration 
requirements under Dodd-Frank leave room for improvement in 
the area of investor protection.  With billions of dollars from 
pension funds, charitable foundations, and educational 
endowments tied up in hedge funds, the SEC should prioritize 
investor protection in its efforts to regulate the industry going 
forward.  This Note argues that the best way to do so is through 
focusing on hedge fund valuation practices and mitigating 
related conflicts of interest. 
135  If funds chose to retain 
the valuation function in-house, they should be required to 
produce written valuation policies and procedures, detailing the 
segregation of duties and internal controls in place to ensure the 
highest level of independence and separation from portfolio 
managers.136
 
133 In her speech to the Managed Funds Association Outlook conference in 
2013, SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated “We knew that there was a gap in our 
knowledge. But, we did not know how many hedge fund managers existed . . . . Until 
[Dodd-Frank], we did not know that we had not accounted for one-third of the 
industry.” Speech by Mary Jo White, supra note 6. 
  These written procedures should be kept current, 
distributed to the government on at least an annual basis, and 
made available to investors upon request. 
134 SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated that the non-public data on hedge funds’ 
risk profiles reported in the Form PF allows regulators to monitor the industry’s 
systemic risk. Id. “Using this information, regulators can then assess trends over 
time and identify risks as they are emerging.” Id. 
135 DUFF & PHELPS, supra note 95. 
136 ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 54, at 15. 
FINAL_FARRELL 9/10/2018  1:54 PM 
2018] INCREASING INVESTOR PROTECTION 169 
Further, the SEC should distinguish between larger funds, 
which account for the majority of the hedge fund industry and 
can afford to shoulder greater regulatory costs, and smaller funds 
for which additional reporting requirements would constitute a 
significant burden.  Specifically, the SEC should require large 
funds, with at least $150 million in AUM that choose to perform 
valuations in-house, to have those valuations reviewed 
periodically by an external third-party valuation expert.137  This 
$150 million threshold aligns with the SEC’s current threshold 
for private funds that are required to register with the SEC and 
file a Form PF.138  Also like the Form PF requirements, funds 
with greater than $150 million in AUM should be required to 
undergo this external review annually, while funds with greater 
than $1.5 billion in AUM should be required to undergo this 
review quarterly.139
Involving external valuation experts will help add 
transparency and independence to the complicated valuation 
process.  In fact, many hedge funds already engage external 
valuation experts in some form for these very reasons.
  The results of these external reviews should 
be filed with the SEC and made available to current investors. 
140  
However, currently, these experts are engaged by hedge funds 
voluntarily, and no mechanism exists to provide a check on the 
valuations conducted by external valuation experts.  Therefore, 
concerns persist as to the expert’s independence and power, as 
with Platinum Partners and Millennium Global Investments.141
To add credibility to the work of external valuation experts, 
Congress should create a private fund industry governing body.  
This body would act under the power and oversight of the SEC 
and would be responsible for periodically reviewing the work of 
the external valuation experts (essentially a review of the 
reviewers).  The organization could mimic the structure of the 
Public Company Auditing Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), a similar 
governing body that oversees the public accounting industry.
 
142
 
137 Id. 
  
138 FORM PF, supra note 82. 
139 Id. 
140 Maxey, supra note 47. 
141 See supra Part IV.E. 
142 The PCAOB is responsible for regulating accounting auditors of public 
companies. About the PCAOB, https://pcaobus.org/About (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). 
Members are appointed by the SEC and the SEC maintains oversight of the board’s 
rules, standards, and budget. Id. 
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This new, private fund governing body would be responsible for 
registering qualified external valuation experts; periodically 
reviewing the work of these experts; and issuing valuation 
standards.  This would promote investor protection and 
transparency by instilling confidence in investors and 
eliminating problematic competing valuation standards.143  
Investors could be confident that when they compared valuation 
and performance of various funds, the funds were using the same 
standards and metrics.  The governing body should also follow 
the lead of the PCAOB by requiring external valuation experts to 
periodically change the partner or managing director leading the 
external valuation, thereby increasing the likelihood that any 
material misstatements would be identified over time as the 
partners leading the external valuation rotated.144
Although these proposed changes in regulation would 
provide greater transparency and confidence to investors and the 
government, hedge funds will likely express concern over 
implementation and compliance costs. This is a legitimate 
concern, particularly at a time when hedge funds have seen a dip 
in investment returns.
 
145
First, the proposals relating to the creation of an 
independent valuation function at the fund level essentially 
proposes to use what is already considered industry best 
practices and mandate them.
  The discussion of costs should be 
broken into two sections: (1) the cost of creating independent 
valuation functions at the fund level, and (2) the creation of an 
industry governing body to oversee valuation at an industry 
level. 
146  Additionally, the valuation 
proposals closely align with the valuation requirements found in 
the AIFMD.147
 
143 See supra note 67. 
  Therefore, hedge funds that fall within the scope 
of the AIFMD have, at least partially, already complied with 
144 The PCAOB requires public accounting firms to rotate audit partners and 
engagement quality review partners every five years to aid in the detection of any 
material misstatements in the financial statements. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 203, 116 Stat. 745, (2002) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) 
145 Several large U.S. pension funds, including plans for California’s, New 
Jersey’s, and Philadelphia’s employees have scaled back investments in hedge funds 
as returns have declined in recent years. Childs & Johnson, supra note 12. 
146 Maxey, supra note 47. 
147 See generally Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1 (EC). 
FINAL_FARRELL 9/10/2018  1:54 PM 
2018] INCREASING INVESTOR PROTECTION 171 
these standards since July 2014.148  Further, the majority of 
hedge funds already engage external valuation experts in some 
form because investors demand it.149
Second, the creation of an industry governing body could 
follow the lead of the PCAOB and be financed by its members.
 
150  
The PCAOB requires all publicly traded companies to share the 
cost of the accounting support fee that funds the PCAOB.151  The 
proposed private fund governing body could do the same, 
requiring all hedge funds with net asset valuation above $150 
million to contribute.  Despite severe criticism, the PCAOB has 
remained intact since its creation by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.152  A recent study concluded the PCAOB increased the 
overall credibility of financial reporting.153
The benefits of increased investor protection are difficult to 
quantify since they only become apparent when a hedge fund 
fails and investors are left empty-handed.  However, since these 
proposals build on existing widespread industry practices and 
regulatory framework implemented elsewhere, the costs are not 
so great as to outweigh the benefits. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Hedge funds provide an alternative method of investment for 
high net worth individuals and institutional investors.  After 
years of operating largely without regulation, governments 
around the world used the fallout of the financial crisis of 2008 to 
introduce new regulation for the hedge fund industry.  In the 
United States, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 required most hedge 
funds to register with the SEC and provide information about the 
funds’ investment strategy, trading practices, leverage, assets 
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627, 628–29 (2014). 
153 The study concluded the introduction of the PCAOB and its inspection 
regime increased capital-market responses to firms’ earnings surprises, indicating 
the audit oversight regime enhanced the credibility of reported earnings. Brandon 
Gipper et al., Public Audit Oversight and Reporting Credibility: Evidence from the 
PCAOB Inspection Regime 39–40 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 21530, 2016). 
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under management, and valuation practices.  This information 
assisted the U.S. government in learning more about the 
industry and in monitoring for systemic risk.  However, the 
legislation left more to be desired in its aim to increase investor 
protection. 
Shortly after the passage of Dodd-Frank, the JOBS Act of 
2012 removed the solicitation ban, allowing hedge funds to reach 
a broader base of potential investors through advertising.  This 
change, along with the general “retailization” of hedge funds, 
increased the number of institutional investors in hedge funds, 
such as public and private pension funds and charitable and 
educational endowments. 
In Europe, the European Council approved the AIFMD, a 
sweeping piece of legislation that aimed to increase investor 
protection, monitor systemic risk, and provide common standards 
for hedge funds doing business in Europe.  Among its directives, 
the AIFMD provided detailed requirements for independent 
hedge fund valuation. 
The U.S. government should follow the AIFMD’s lead in 
requiring greater standardization and transparency of hedge 
fund valuation.  The United States should require hedge funds to 
either engage external valuation experts to value their assets or 
at least require that funds create and document valuation 
functions that are as independent as possible from the portfolio 
managers.  This would increase investor protection by providing 
investors with confidence in the valuations they see and also by 
providing common metrics to compare funds.  To ensure that the 
external valuation experts are truly independent, Congress 
should also create an industry governing body that would have 
the power to inspect the external valuation expert’s reports, 
accredit valuation experts, and issue valuation standards for the 
industry.  Together, these measures would strengthen confidence 
in hedge fund valuations and improve investor protection for the 
millions of Americans who rely on hedge funds for their financial 
security. 
 
